for reference:
- (when referenced) my two states are china and indonesia.
- this is the marking / grading scheme
- each of the prompts was meant to be written up in a maximum of 500 words (footnotes count!)
here is the midterm (with evaluation). i’m feeling good about this one!
Op-Ed: How Have Your States Harnessed Value-Chain Participation?
prompt
Value-chain participation has frequently been pitched as a means for developing economies to achieve economic prosperity. However, many economies have found themselves locked into low value-added activities without a clear path for upgrading, consequently finding their economic development hindered by value-chain participation.
Take a look at how economic actors your two states participate in regional value chains or have been hindered from doing so, and how this has facilitated or hampered their economic development/growth paths. What broader policy-related lessons can you take away from these states’ experiences?
Comments and Considerations
Trade and FDI data can give you an idea of how economies participate in value chains, particularly through upstream and intermediate exports. World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) provides estimates of this alongside more conventional trade statistics, but the secondary academic and policy literatures may also be useful in providing analyses and visualisations.
Don’t worry about case-selection concerns. Different state pairs are likely to lead to very different views on value chains and development. Data availability and case selection are often driven by decisions beyond the analyst’s control; working within these limitations to develop more widely applicable insights is a valuable skill.
Your two states should form the basis for your analysis, but you are welcome to draw lessons for groups of states that extend beyond the East Asian region. Looking beyond the region may also be useful if you wish to (briefly) suggest how one or both of your states might improve their prospects.
Structure and Style
The Week 3 prompt in the first portfolio provides guidance for writing an op-ed. Structure your op-ed around the lessons that you draw from your two states. This should not be structured or written following a ‘compare-contrast’-driven approach.
Value chains: damned if you do, damned if you don’t?
Two countries derive the same percentage of their economic output from the global value chain, but for one that share is twenty times bigger than for the other. Those two countries are China and Indonesia[1], and their stories tell a cautionary tale for globalists all over the world.
Since its economic liberalisation in 1978[2], China’s growth was for decades connected to low value-added activities, leading to it being dubbed the “world’s factory”[3]. Despite its meteoric growth[4], it is still trying to “escape” the confines of that position[5] and build its own innovation[6], perhaps now mostly limited by its regulatory[7] and political issues[8].
Indonesia’s participation in foreign value chains instead remains focused on upstream activities and bilateral trade rather than complex integration into global supply chains. Over the past twenty years, its intermediate supply links weakened, and it deepened its regional ties[9], as key importers of its value-add went from global to mostly developed Asian economies[10]. This approach is limiting its growth, while China’s position as both Indonesia’s top exporter and importer[11] exposes it to political risk[12].
Even if industrialisation is still the best way for middle-income countries to grow[13], global value-chain participation in and of itself is not necessarily a desired policy goal if the country is locked into low value-added activities[14]; even China still hasn’t fully emancipated it from its negative externalities[15].
As the Covid-19 pandemic showed the world[16], globalisation comes with its own additional risks[17]. It is perhaps telling, then, that China is using the post-pandemic shock to promote regionalisation[18]. It also explains the pull of regionalisation in a globalised world[19]: if globalisation is rigged against developing countries[20], with the global north enjoying a century-long head start because of economics and politics[21], who wouldn’t want to start anew?
Bibliography
Asian Development Bank. “The Evolution of Indonesia’s Participation in Global Value Chains.” October 29, 2019. https://www.adb.org/publications/evolution-indonesia-participation-global-value-chains.
Chen, Xiangguo. “Is China the Factory of the World?.” Ritsumeikan Center for Asia Pacific Studies (RCAPS). Occasional paper 7, no. 4 (2007).
Chen, Jin, Ximing Yin, and Liang Mei. “Holistic innovation: An emerging innovation paradigm.” International Journal of Innovation Studies 2, no. 1 (2018): 1-13.
Chernilo, Daniel. “One globalisation or many? Risk society in the age of the Anthropocene.” Journal of Sociology 57, no. 1 (2021): 12-26.
Fischbacher-Smith, Denis, and Liam Smith. “Navigating the ‘dark waters of globalisation’: Global markets, inequalities and the spatial dynamics of risk.” Risk management 17 (2015): 179-203.
Garnaut, Ross, Ligang Song, and Cai Fang. China’s 40 years of reform and development: 1978–2018. Anu Press, 2018.
Hartmann, Dominik, Ligia Zagato, Paulo Gala, and Flavio L. Pinheiro. “Why did some countries catch-up, while others got stuck in the middle? Stages of productive sophistication and smart industrial policies.” Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 58 (2021): 1-13.
Islam, Mohammad Tarikul, and Doren Chadee. “Stuck at the bottom: Role of tacit and explicit knowledge on innovation of developing-country suppliers in global value chains.” International Business Review 32, no. 2 (2023): 101898.
Li, Yan, Huiying Sun, Jincheng Huang, and Qingbo Huang. “Low-end lock-in of Chinese equipment manufacturing industry and the global value chain.” Sustainability 12, no. 7 (2020): 2981.
Liao, Hongwei, Liangping Yang, Henan Ma, and JiaoJiao Zheng. “Technology import, secondary innovation, and industrial structure optimization: A potential innovation strategy for China.” Pacific Economic Review 25, no. 2 (2020): 145-160.
Pabst, Adrian. “Is global governance unravelling? The revolt against liberal globalisation.” Global Governance in Transformation: Challenges for International Cooperation (2020): 15-34.
Prabhakar. “A critical reflection on globalisation and inequality: A new approach to the development of the south.” African and Asian Studies 2, no. 3 (2003): 307-345.
Su, Dan, and Yang Yao. “Manufacturing as the key engine of economic growth for middle-income economies.” Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy 22, no. 1 (2017): 47-70.
Suder, Gabriele, Peter W. Liesch, Satoshi Inomata, Irina Mihailova, and Bo Meng. “The evolving geography of production hubs and regional value chains across East Asia: Trade in value-added.” Journal of World Business 50, no. 3 (2015): 404-416.
The Economist Intelligence Unit. “The Great Unwinding: Covid-19 and the regionalisation of global supply chains”, 2020. Available at https://www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/the-great-unwinding-covid-19-supply-chains-and-regional-blocs/
Watkins, Kevin, and Penny Fowler. Rigged rules and double standards: trade, globalisation, and the fight against poverty. Oxfam, 2002.
WITS. Country Snapshot: Indonesia, available at https://wits.worldbank.org/countrysnapshot/en/IDN
WITS. GVP Output by Country, available at https://wits.worldbank.org/gvc/gvc-output-by-country.html
World Bank. Doing business 2020 – world bank, 2020. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/server/api/
core/bitstreams/75ea67f9-4bcb-5766-ada6-6963a992d64c/content.
World Bank Open Data. “GDP (Current US$) – China.”. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=CN.
Wang, Zhaohui, and Zhiqiang Sun. “From globalization to regionalization: The United States, China, and the post-Covid-19 world economic order.” Journal of Chinese Political Science 26 (2021): 69-87.
Zhang, Weiying. “张维迎 ‘自由是一种责任’ 演讲完整视频 （在北京大学国家发展研究院2017年毕业典礼上的发言）.” YouTube, July 7, 2017. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P8FRqN2UZoM&t=21s.
Zhao, Jing, Ziru Zhao, and Huan Zhang. “The impact of growth, energy and financial development on environmental pollution in China: New evidence from a spatial econometric analysis.” Energy Economics 93 (2021): 104506.
Op-Ed: Sustainable Fisheries
prompt
Fisheries are essential to food supplies for populations across East Asia. Choose a sustainability-focused policy and analyse its effectiveness through the interests and institutions framework. Consider its impact on a range of
outcomes, such as employment, food security, biodiversity, and interstate relations.
Comments and Considerations
If you need to refresh your memory, the interests and institutions framework was first discussed in Week 1 and has been applied to different topics throughout the term. Clarification: Your focus here should be on how
stakeholders interact with institutions, such as shaping them to affect outcomes, and/or responding to the consequences of existing institutional structures.
Your policy choice may relate to issues like take reduction, bycatch reduction, biomass preservation, aquaculture adoption/adaptation, no take zones, etc. If you choose to work on China, ignore its South China Sea and distant waters fisheries. Focus instead on fisheries that are more likely to actually be managed in accordance with publicly-stated sustainability objectives, such as some of its inland fisheries and aquaculture developments.
Policy assessments may account for management challenges inherent to straddling stocks and other collaborative issues.
Information from regional fisheries organizations may be helpful, such as the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission, the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, the North Pacific Fisheries Commission, and the North Pacific Anadromous Fish Commission.
Structure and Style
You may want to revisit the op-ed guidance from the first half of term.
In Indonesia, Sustainable Fishing Requires Cooperation, Not Just Quotas
2024 should have started with good news for the environment, as the Quota-Based Fisheries Management (QBFM) regulation[22], Indonesia’s attempt at balancing economic growth, fisherman welfare, and environmental concerns, was set to be implemented. Instead, its botched rollout and mounting implementation delays demonstrate the importance of setting informed and cooperative policy.
While the previous regime foresaw an annual quota for all fisheries[23], QBFM introduces two new criteria: fishing zones and fisherman categories. Small fishermen are allowed to operate without boats in Local Zones, while local and industrial fishermen are allocated quotas in Regional and Industrial zones respectively. However, the latter extend beyond 12 nautical miles, granting industrial fishermen access to richer, previously restricted fishing grounds. Local fishermen and conservation scientists alike worry this will lead to overexploitation, given Indonesia’s high levels of marine biodiversity[24], and government agencies’ difficulties implementing QBFM’s monitoring requirements[25].
Though intended to support small-scale fishermen, provisions allowing fishing without a license in Local zones pale in comparison to the larger quotas granted in Regional and Industrial zones. Additionally, QBFM’s fishermen categories are vaguely defined[26], heightening risks of unequal quota allocation. In its quest to improve revenues from fishing[27], QBFM seems poised to consolidate industrial fleets’ access at the expense of traditional fishermen’s welfare and fisheries’ sustainability.
The Indonesian Ombudsman revealed lacklustre efforts to educate fishermen and upgrade fishing infrastructure for QBFM during the year-long grace period since its adoption, with most fishermen unaware of the zoning and quota changes. To address this, the Indonesian government further delayed the enforcement of QBFM until 2025[28], issuing revised guidelines relaxing restrictions and fees associated with QBFM. For instance, small-scale fishermen will be allowed to maintain their current ports instead of those foreseen under the new policy. While perhaps politically motivated[29], the ongoing delay is a key opportunity for government to reverse course and raise awareness of QBFM before its eventual implementation.
The QBFM saga embodies policy and regulatory capture by industrial interests[30], rather than a bottom-up process incorporating fishermen’s perspectives[31]. Indeed, government consultations during the formulation of QBFM only involved academics and industry observers[32], marginalising the small-scale fishermen who form the backbone of Indonesia’s fishing industry[33] and leading to a perception that QBFM was only catering to big businesses and foreign investment[34]. The eventual success of Indonesia’s sustainable fisheries’ growth will depend less on ministries micromanaging fishing quotas, and more on cooperative governance recognising fishermen as valued and empowered stakeholders, to develop policy reflecting on-the-ground reality[35].
Bibliography
Aprian, Mukti, Luky Adrianto, Mennofatria Boer, and Fery Kurniawan. “Re-thinking Indonesian marine fisheries quota-based policy: A qualitative network of stakeholder perception at fisheries management area 718.” Ocean & Coastal Management 243 (2023): 106766.
Carpenter, Daniel, and David A. Moss, eds. Preventing regulatory capture: Special interest influence and how to limit it. Cambridge University Press, 2013.
Gokkon, Basten. “Rule Change Sees Foreign Investors Back in Indonesia’s Fisheries Scene.” Mongabay Environmental News, March 10, 2023. https://news.mongabay.com/2023/03/indonesia-fisheries-management-policy-foreign-investment-marine-sustainable/.
Gokkon, Basten. “Indonesian Fishers Not Biting at New Policy Perceived as Undermining Them.” Mongabay Environmental News, August 16, 2023. https://news.mongabay.com/2023/08/indonesia-quota-based-fisheries-policy-fishing-artisanal-commercial-stocks-sustainable/.
Gokkon, Basten. “With Indonesia’s New Fishing Policy Starting Soon, Fishers Still Mostly Unaware.” Mongabay Environmental News, December 6, 2023. https://news.mongabay.com/2023/12/indonesia-fisheries-fishing-sustainable-management-marine-policy-destructive-ombudsman/.
Gokkon, Basten. “Indonesia Delays Enforcement of Widely Panned Fisheries Policy.” Mongabay Environmental News, December 17, 2023. https://news.mongabay.com/2023/12/indonesa-fisheries-quota-policy-sustainable-ministry-small-fishers/.
Imperial, Mark T. “Implementation structures: The use of top-down and bottom-up approaches to policy implementation.” In Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics. 2021.
Jaffrey, Sana. “Indonesia’s 2024 Presidential Election Could Be the Last Battle of the …” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 5, 2023. https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/10/05/indonesia-s-2024-presidential-election-could-be-last-battle-of-titans-pub-90711.
Levine, Michael E., and Jennifer L. Forrence. “Regulatory capture, public interest, and the public agenda: Toward a synthesis.” JL Econ & Org. 6 (1990): 167.
Ministry of National Development Planning (BAPPENAS) Republic of Indonesia. “Indonesia’s Sustainable Fisheries Policies”, 2023. Available at http://icfc2023.org/file/eng/%EC%84%B8%ED%8B%B0%EC%95%BC%ED%8B%B0.pdf
Paddock, Richard C., and Muktita Suhartono. “A President’s Son Is in Indonesia’s Election Picture. Is It Democracy or Dynasty?” The New York Times, January 6, 2024. https://www.nytimes.com/2024/01/06/world/asia/indonesia-presidential-election-dynasty.html.
“PP No. 11 Tahun 2023.” Database Peraturan | JDIH BPK, 2023. Available at https://peraturan.bpk.go.id/
Details/244907/pp-no-11-tahun-2023.
RI, Menteri Kelautan dan Perikanan. “TENTANG RELAKSASI KEBIJAKAN PADA MASA TRANSISI PELAKSANAANPENANGKAPAN IKAN TERUKUR”, 29/11/2023. Available at https://drive.google.com/file/d/1-QYR9rubOi2dSm4l8ktUCEutWBZFUnsR/view
RI, Ombudsman. “Program Penangkapan Ikan Terukur Dinilai Belum Akuntabel Dan Transparan.” “Indonesian Ombudsman: The Measurable Fishing Program is Considered Not Accountable and Transparent”. Ombudsman RI, November 30, 2023. https://ombudsman.go.id/news/r/ombudsman-ri-program-penangkapan-ikan-terukur-dinilai-belum-akuntabel-dan-transparan.
Policy Brief: Deep Integration in East Asia
prompt
Proponents of deep integration argue that it levels the playing field between economies by generating a unified regulatory environment, thus reducing hurdles and costs for otherwise disadvantaged new entrants to international trade. Critics contend that deep integration reduces the policy space for governments that are unable to set the agenda themselves, infringing upon domestic sovereignty and precluding desirable policy options.
Choose one of your states and investigate its experience (or lack thereof) with deep integration through reciprocal trade agreements. Make a case for why your state should – or should not – pursue deep integration relating to labour standards and/or environmental protection in future trade agreements with partners across the Asia-Pacific.
Comments and Considerations
Globally, regulatory orbits – that is, the focal points around which the harmonization of regulations and standards coalesce – have been driven primarily by the EU and US. There are a couple of other emergent options in East Asia: China’s political assertiveness has meant that it is willing to flex its muscle on these sorts of issues, while Japan and South Korea’s influence on the CPTPP has given these states (and the CPTPP bloc) something of a role as regional focal point for harmonization.
You can choose either one of your states, but you will want to consider whether it would be likely to set the agenda on labour and/or environmental harmonization or negotiating from a weaker position. Even though the substantive issues addressed here differ from those discussed in seminar, it will probably be useful to go back through your seminar notes on deep integration.
Structure and Style
The Week 4 prompt in the first portfolio provides guidance for writing a policy brief.
brief
Environmental commitments in trade agreements[36] across the Asia-Pacific are a fundamental tool for China to advance its goal of green development while solidifying its central role in the region.
Far from necessarily harming the environment[37], trade agreements with environmental provisions can raise developing countries’ environmental protection standards[38] to ultimately[39] increase their exports in developed countries[40], as evidenced by China’s journey into international economic integration[41]. In this way, environmental protection dismantles behind-the-border barriers[42], leading to further “positive integration”[43] while fuelling trade liberalisation and countering geographical barriers[44].
Drawing on a rich history of Asian environmental cooperation[45], China’s support for the environment in its trade agreements has steadily increased[46]. Much unlike its first agreement after its succession to the WTO, China’s recent trade agreements with more developed countries strongly emphasise environmental issues[47]. While this trend is not entirely consolidated[48], the commitment to a “green economy” as part of a “community of common destiny”[49] in the ongoing China-ASEAN FTA 3.0 negotiations[50] is a positive signal that the country is ready to take on a leading role in East Asia’s green development, by acting as the more developed partner pushing for innovative[51] environmental protection clauses in trade agreements with other Asian nations.
However, China’s historical political preference for “shallow” integration[52], ongoing maritime disputes[53] and unwillingness to engage civil society[54] reduce its traction in the region. China’s ongoing domestic reform can improve its standing, bridging the gap between rhetoric and implementation; and accepting binding international commitments through trade agreements will strengthen both the reform and its positive perception[55].
By championing environmental protection in future trade agreements in the region, China can lead the economic development of Asian countries, ensuring it aligns harmoniously with environmental stewardship[56]. This is a golden opportunity[57] to pursue economically beneficial deep integration while addressing the uncontroversial issue of climate change[58], assuaging fears that China-led regional integration aims at side-lining the WTO order[59].
Bibliography
Abman, Ryan, Clark Lundberg, and Michele Ruta. “The effectiveness of environmental provisions in regional trade agreements.” (2021). World Bank Group Policy Research Working Paper 9601. Available at https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/980421616686312761/pdf/The-Effectiveness-of-Environmental-Provisions-in-Regional-Trade-Agreements.pdf
Araujo, Billy A. Melo. “Setting the rules of the game: the rise (and fall) of mega-regionals, deep integration and the role of the WTO.” UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs (2017): 151-203.
Ball, Jeffrey. “Power play: How the US benefits if China greens the Global South.” (2023). Available at https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/FP_20230215_climate_energy_ball.pdf
Berger, Axel, Clara Brandi, Dominique Bruhn, and Manjiao Chi. Towards “greening” trade? Tracking environmental provisions in the preferential trade agreements of emerging markets. No. 2/2017. Discussion Paper, 2017.
Brandi, Clara, Jakob Schwab, Axel Berger, and Jean-Frédéric Morin. “Do environmental provisions in trade agreements make exports from developing countries greener?.” World Development 129 (2020): 104899.
Chou, Bill KP. “China’s economic integration into global regulatory frameworks: A study of government procurement.” Communist and Post-Communist Studies 39, no. 4 (2006): 431-445.
Dosch, Joern. “Reconciling trade and environmental protection in ASEAN-China relations: more than political window dressing?.” Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 30, no. 2 (2011): 7-29.
Eckhardt, Jappe, and Hongyu Wang. “China’s new generation trade agreements: Importing rules to lock in domestic reform?.” Regulation & Governance 15, no. 3 (2021): 581-597.
Evenett, Simon J. “Can the World Trade Organization Act as a Bulwark Against Deglobalization?.” Asian Economic Policy Review (2023).
Gao, Bai. “Reciprocal Openness: The Inevitable Path for China Toward a Developed Country.”, Duke Global Working Paper Series No. 48 (2022).
Grübler, Julia, Roman Stöllinger, and Gabriele Tondl. Wanted! Free trade agreements in the service of environmental and climate protection. No. 451. wiiw Research Report, 2021. Available at https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/240651/1/1747410535.pdf
Jiang, Yang. “China’s pursuit of free trade agreements: Is China exceptional?.” Review of International Political Economy 17, no. 2 (2010): 238-261.
Kim, Soo Yeon. “Deep integration and regional trade agreements.” In The Oxford Handbook of the Political Economy of International Trade, ed. Lisa L. Martin. Oxford University Press, 2015.
Koo, Min Gyo, and Seo Young Kim. “East Asian way of linking the environment to trade in free trade agreements.” The Journal of Environment & Development 27, no. 4 (2018): 382-414.
Kuhn, Berthold M. “China’s commitment to the sustainable development goals: An analysis of push and pull factors and implementation challenges.” Chinese Political Science Review 3, no. 4 (2018): 359-388.
Laurens, Noémie, and Jean-Frédéric Morin. “Negotiating environmental protection in trade agreements: A regime shift or a tactical linkage?.” International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 19, no. 6 (2019): 533-556.
Lin, Kun-Chin. “Politics and the market in twenty-first-century China: Strategies of authoritarian management of state–society relations.” Political Studies Review 10, no. 1 (2012): 73-84.
Marquis, Christopher, Jianjun Zhang, and Yanhua Zhou. “Regulatory uncertainty and corporate responses to environmental protection in China.” California Management Review 54, no. 1 (2011): 39-63.
Miura, Kacie. “Strongman politics and China’s foreign policy actors: maritime assertiveness under Xi Jinping.” International Affairs 99, no. 5 (2023): 2101-2118.
MOFCOM. “Version 3.0 China-ASEAN FTA Negotiations Start First Round Consultations.” China FTA Network, February 9, 2023. http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/enarticle/enasean/chianaseannews/202302/51918_1.html.
Morin, Jean-Frédéric, and Rosalie Gauthier Nadeau. “Environmental Gems in trade agreements: Little-known clauses for progressive trade agreements.” (2017).
Morin, Jean Frédéric, Joost Pauwelyn, and James Hollway. “The trade regime as a complex adaptive system: Exploration and exploitation of environmental norms in trade agreements.” Journal of International Economic Law 20, no. 2 (2017): 365-390.
Osnago, Alberto, Nadia Rocha, and Michele Ruta. “Deep trade agreements and vertical FDI: The devil is in the details.” Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d’économique 52, no. 4 (2019): 1558-1599.
Petersmann, Ernst-Ulrich. “From “Negative” to “Positive” Integration in the WTO: Time for Mainstreaming Human Rights’ into WTO Law?.” Common Market Law Review 37, no. 6 (2000).
Rusmuliadi, Rusmuliadi. “Non-Claimant States Perspectives On The South China Sea Dispute.” Lampung Journal of International Law 5, no. 1 (2023): 1-14.
Ross, Lester. “China: environmental protection, domestic policy trends, patterns of participation in regimes and compliance with international norms.” The China Quarterly 156 (1998): 809-835.
Sander, Harald. “Deep integration, shallow regionalism, and strategic openness: Three notes on economic integration in East Asia.” In International Economic Integration, pp. 211-244. Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag HD, 1995.
Sarker, Pradip Kumar, Md Saifur Rahman, and Lukas Giessen. “Regional economic regimes and the environment: stronger institutional design is weakening environmental policy capacity of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation.” International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 19 (2019): 19-52.
Stafford-Smith, Mark, David Griggs, Owen Gaffney, Farooq Ullah, Belinda Reyers, Norichika Kanie, Bjorn Stigson, Paul Shrivastava, Melissa Leach, and Deborah O’Connell. “Integration: the key to implementing the Sustainable Development Goals.” Sustainability science 12 (2017): 911-919.
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Vuković, Siniša, and Paul-Jakob Vuković. “China’s Behavior and Ambitions to Become a Norm-maker in the South China Sea Dispute.” Asian Perspective 47, no. 2 (2023): 247-265.
Wan, Lu, Fu Yi-zhong, and Liu Guan-chu. “The Impact of Environmental Protection Regulations on Trade Liberalization: Evidence from the Environmental Provisions Under China’s Free Trade Agreements.” In 1st International Conference on Contemporary Education and Economic Development (CEED 2018), pp. 266-270. Atlantis Press, 2018.
Wang, Jun, Chengjuan Liao, Jie Xiong, and Chengbo Wang. “Deepening of Free Trade Agreements and International Trade: Evidence from China.” Emerging Markets Finance and Trade 59, no. 6 (2023): 1960-1975.
Wei, Dan, and Ângelo Patrício Rafael. “China’s Approach to sustainable development in free trade agreements.” Law and Development Review 16, no. 2 (2023): 367-384.
Wong, John, and Sarah Chan. “China-ASEAN free trade agreement: shaping future economic relations.” Asian Survey 43, no. 3 (2003): 507-526.
Yang, Wanhua. “Environmental Provisions in the WTO Agreements and their Implications for China as a Member.” Rev. Eur. Comp. & Int’l Envtl. L. 11 (2002): 314.
Yoo, In Tae, and Inkyoung Kim. “Free trade agreements for the environment? Regional economic integration and environmental cooperation in East Asia.” International environmental agreements: Politics, law and economics 16 (2016): 721-738.
Zeng, Ka. “China’s free trade agreement diplomacy.” The Chinese Journal of International Politics 9, no. 3 (2016): 277-305.
Zeng, Ka, and Josh Eastin. “International economic integration and environmental protection: The case of China.” International Studies Quarterly 51, no. 4 (2007): 971-995.
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[1] China’s GVC-related output as of 2021 is 8.74% of its total output and 19.20% of the world’s GVC-related output. Indonesia’s GVC-related output as of 2021 is 8.75% of its total output and 0.901 % of the world’s GVC-related output. Source: WITS GVC Output by Country (adb).
[2] For an overview of the following 40 years, see Garnaut, Song and Fang, 2018.
[3] For a history of the expression, see Chen, 2007.
[4] See World bank data.
[5] Li et al, 2020; Hartmann et al, 2021.
[6] Liao et al, 2020; Chen, Yin and Mei, 2018.
[7] The Doing Business report 2020 highlights China’s usage of the index itself as a measure for its regulatory reform efforts.
[8] See the surprisingly direct graduation speech given by economic professor Zhang Weiying at the Peking University National School of Development in 2017.
[9] Suder et al, 2015.
[10] Asian Development Bank, 2019. See also
[11] WITS. Country Snapshot: Indonesia
[12] Asian Development Bank, 2019.
[13] Su, Yao, 2017.
[14] Islam and Chadee, 2023.
[15] Zhao, Zhao and Zhang, 2021.
[16] Chernilo, 2021.
[17] The Economist Intelligence Unit 2020, Fischbacher-Smith and Smith, 2015.
[18] Wang, Sun, 2021.
[19] Pabst 2020.
[20] Watkins and Fowler, 2002.
[21] Prabhakar, 2003.
[22] JDIH BPK, 2023.
[23] Gokkon, 6 December 2023.
[24] Aprian et al, 2023.
[25] Gokkon August 2023, 17 December 2023; RI Ombudsman, 2023.
[26] RI Ombudsman, 2023.
[27] BAPPENAS, 2023.
[28] RI, Menteri Kelautan dan Perikanan, 2023.
[29] Jaffrey, 2023; Paddock and Suhartono, 2024.
[30] Levine and Forrence, 1990.
[31] Imperial, 2021.
[32] RI Ombudsman, 2023.
[33] According to BAPPENAS (2023), “Fishing vessels in Indonesian fisheries are limited to small vessels (90% are <10 GT)”.
[34] Gokkon, March 2023.
[35] Carpenter and Moss, 2013.
[36] Berger et al, 2017.
[37] Abman, Lundberg, and Ruta, 2021.
[38] Zeng and Eastin, 2007.
[39] Wang et al 2023.
[40] Brandi et al, 2020.
[41] Zeng and Eastin, 2007.
[42] Kim, 2015, p. 361.
[43] An approach championed by the WTO: see Kim, 2015, p. 361; see also Petersmann, 2000.
[44] Sander, 1995, p. 214; Viner, 1950.
[45] Yoo and Kim, 2016.
[46] Wan, Fu, Liu, 2018.
[47] China-Switzerland (2013) and China-Korea (2015) include each a full chapter on the environment, while China-Macao (2003) and China-Hong Kong (2003) do not mention any environmental matters. See Berger et al, 2017.
[48] 2020’s Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) notably does not include strong environmental protections. Center for Environmental Concerns, 2023.
[49] Yoo and Kim, 2016.
[50] MOFCOM, 2023.
[51] This area is ripe for legal innovation. See Morin, Pauwelyn and Hollway, 2017; Laurens and Morin 2019.
[52] Ross, 1998; Zeng and Eastin, 2007; Wei and Rafael, 2023.
[53] Vuković and Vuković, 2023; Miura, 2023; Rusmuliadi, 2023.
[54] Wei and Rafael, 2023.
[55] Eckhardt and Wang 2021; Lin, 2012.
[56] Kuhn, 2018.
[57] Ball, 2023.
[58] Zeng, 2016; Eckhardt and Wang 2021.
[59] Sander, 1995, p. 211; Araujo, 2017; Evenett, 2023.